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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Cross-Respondent, 
vs. 
GREGORY J. MARSHALL, 
Defendant/Cross-Petitioner, 
Case No. 890121-CA 
Category No. 13 
CROSS-PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals had any legal basis to rehear the case after 
having made its decision on December 26, 1989. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erroneously remanded the case for further 
proceedings and in doing so rendered an inconsistent opinion thereby allowing an 
issue waived by the Cross-Respondent to be examined, for the first time, in the 
Court of Appeals. 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling that the detention of the 
Cross-Petitioner was constitutional. 
4. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling that the stop of the 
Cross-Petitioner was lawful. 
5. If consent is found by this Court, the lower court erred in the failing to 
reach the issue of whether the consent was exploited from the illegal stop and/or 
detention which was not sufficiently distinguishable from the prior illegality to 
render the evidence admissible. 
OPINION BELOW 
This opinion below is the amended opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals 
issued on April 18, 1990, in State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1990) {See Addendum A for the text of the decision). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This is a cross petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals which reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence and which remanded the matter to the district court for further 
evidentiary hearing. Cross/Respondent petitioned for Writ of Certiorari on 
May 18, 1990. By order dated May 15, 1990, Cross-Petitioner was granted an 
extension of time to file its petition for Writ of Certiorari to May 31, 1990. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) and § 78-2a-4 (1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, Rules and Regulations 
controlling in this matter are included in Addendum C attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Gregory J. Marshall, was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8 (1990) (R. 2). Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence 
(R. 23-24). The motion was denied (R. 54-55). Defendant filed an interlocutory 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 91, 187). 
On December 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
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denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress on the basis that "Mr. Marshall did 
not consent to the search of the locked suitcases found in the trunk of his vehicle" 
(footnote omitted) (State v. Marshall, 124 Utah Adv. Rptr. 59 at 65, Addendum 
B). (Utah Ct. App. 1989) The State petitioned for rehearing which was granted. 
On April 18, 1990, the Court of Appeals issued its amended opinion. The court's 
amended opinion reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress but 
also remanded the case for rehearing: 
". . . on the limited issues of whether Mr. Marshall 
voluntarily consented to the search of the trunk or the 
suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall abandoned any privacy 
interest in the suitcases and thus lacks standing to 
challenge their search, and finally, if the trial court finds 
there was an illegal search of the truck or suitcases, 
whether there is a sufficient nexus between that illegal 
search and Mr. Marshall's abandonment, if any, of his 
expectation of privacy in the suitcases" 
(Addendum A, State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 at 50-51) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to the testimony of the arresting officer, on April 25, 1988, he 
stopped the vehicle of the Cross-Petitioner, travelling east bound on 1-70 after it 
(the vehicle) had passed a motor home (R.56) [This is the page following page 56, 
to which the clerk omitted giving a number]. The officer has repeatedly testified 
that the reason he stopped the vehicle was because the Cross-Petitioner had left 
his turn signal on for approximately two miles, which the officer considered to be 
a violation of the Utah State Law (R.56). It was his intent, at the time he stopped 
the vehicle, to advise the operator of the turn signal problem (D.l,p.l5, 1.10) 
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(T.l.p.Sjl.lS^l).1 
Upon making contact with the driver, the officer testified that he informed 
the Cross-Petitioner that his turn signal had been left on and proceeded to conduct 
a further investigation. In the course of this detention and prior to obtaining any 
"alleged consent" to search the vehicle, the officer became suspicious that there 
may be drug activity based upon the application of a "drug courier profile". In 
support of the officer's suspicion, he stated that: 
a. Before the stop, he noticed the following: 
1. That the vehicle had out-of-state license plates from California (R.57) 
(T.l.p.l3;1.8-12 and T.l.p.l0;1.6-10). 
2. He acknowledged that, in his experience, a car traveling east may indicate 
that the car is carrying drugs and a car traveling west might be more likely carrying 
money (R.57) (T.l .p.ll ; l . l-4). 
3. He also noticed, prior to stopping the vehicle, that there was one male 
individual in the vehicle who could be seen and that, in his experience, it was more 
likely that a male would be carrying drugs than a female (R.57) (T.l.p.ll;1.12-25 
andT.l.p.l2;l.l-13). 
b. Upon making contact with Cross-Petitioner, the officer noticed and 
commented on the following: 
1. That the driver had an "eastern" accent (R.57) (T.l.p. 12:1.24-25 and 
\ The record in this matter includes the testimony of Trooper Dennis Avery 
of the Utah Highway Patrol at the Suppression Hearing, (T.l); the Preliminary 
Hearing (T.2); and his deposition in a related matter (D.l), that is, State of Utah 
v. One Thousand One Hundred Ninety Seven Dollars in United States 
Currency, Case No. 10246, a forfeiture action presently pending before the 6th 
Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, State of Utah. 
A 
T.i.p.l3;l.l) and that he produced a New York driver's license. 
2. He indicated that the fact the individual was obviously from New York 
and was driving an automobile rented in California aroused his suspicions (R.57-
58) (T.l.p.l3;1.8-12). 
3. The other information he noticed during the course of his investigation 
that raised his suspicion was that there was one small, red bag, a can of "Fix-a-
Flat", a CB radio, and a steering wheel locking device in the front seat area of the 
vehicle (R.58) (T.l.p.l3;1.21-25 and T.l.p.l4;l.l-2). The fact that he could see no 
other luggage in the vehicle and just the one small bag was suspicious to the 
officer even though at that point he did not know if there was luggage in the trunk 
(R.58) (T.l.p.l4;1.3-10). 
4. The officer also stated that Cross-Petitioner avoided eye contact with him 
and seemed to be somewhat nervous (R.58) (T.l.p.30;l. 16-25 and D.l.p.53;l.ll). 
5. The officer further testified that he asked Cross-Petitioner for the vehicle 
rental agreement which he examined, indicating that the car was to be turned into 
a different location than the Cross-Petitioner told him where he was possibly going 
to return the vehicle. Nevertheless, the officer acknowledged that at the bottom 
of the rental agreement it showed that the car didn't necessarily have to be 
returned to the destination that was stated (R.58) (T.l.p.l4;l. 17-25 and 
T.l.p.l5;l.l-17). 
Based on the foregoing observations and prior to asking the Cross-Petitioner 
if he could "look in the vehicle" (R.59) (T.l.p.22;l. 11-15), the officer testified that 
he determined he would get a search warrant to search for controlled substances 
even though there was no apparent evidence of controlled substances in the 
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interior of the car or any other evidence of illegal activity (R.59) (T.l.p.l5;l.19-25 
andT.l.p.20;1.14-19). 
After issuing the warning citation and while Cross-Petitioner was seated in 
the officer's patrol car, the officer proceeded to question Cross-Petitioner (R.59) 
(T.l.p.20;1.20-25). He did not advise Cross-Petitioner that he was free to leave 
after he gave him back his driver's license, registration and warning citation (R.59) 
(T.p.21;1.2-13). The officer further testified that although Cross-Petitioner was 
free to leave, if Cross-Petitioner had tried to leave, he would have found it to be 
more suspicious activity and would have stopped him (R.59) (T.l.p.21;L14-18 and 
T.l.p.22;1.22-25 to p.23;l.l-2). 
The officer thereafter questioned Cross-Petitioner as to whether he was 
carrying certain items such as firearms, drugs or alcohol (R.59) (T.l.p.22;1.6-9). 
After receiving the Cross-Petitioner's response he asked if he could, "Look in the 
vehicle." (R.59) (T.l.p.22;l.11-15). Mr. Marshall acquiesced to the officer's 
request to "look in the vehicle" whereupon the officer examined the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle, including the red bag which Cross-Petitioner had in 
the front seat. 
After searching the interior of the vehicle and its contents and finding no 
indication of contraband, the officer asked the Cross-Petitioner "if he had a key" 
(to the trunk) and "if he would open it" (R.60) (T.l.p.27;1.12-14). 
Inside the trunk were four bags which the officer proceeded to search. He 
claims he found a green/leafy substance in one of the bags. The bags were 
padlocked at the time and the bag in which the green/leafy substance was found 
had to be broken open to be searched. 
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POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD NO LEGAL BASIS TO REHEAR 
THE CASE AND MODIFY ITS DECISION FROM DECEMBER 26, 
1989. 
The Court of Appeals initially made its decision in this matter on December 
26, 1989. Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, the 
rule governing rehearing, "a petition for rehearing must state with particularity 
the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or 
misapprehended." Case law establishes that a rehearing is only warranted on those 
grounds. See e.g. Cummings v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 172-173, 129 P. 619, 624 
(1913); Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (1886). Since the Respondent 
sought rehearing, it was the Respondent's burden to establish that the Court erred 
under either of the above-stated grounds. 
Neither the Cross-Respondent's Petition nor the Court of Appeals' Amended 
Decision establish that any law or facts were overlooked or misapprehended. The 
Court of Appeals, nevertheless, in its amended opinion, modified its prior ruling 
and remanded this matter for further proceedings before the trial court, on the 
basis that the finding below was insufficient. No where in the opinion did the 
Court of Appeals rule that either of the parties had overlooked or misapprehended 
facts or law. The facts developed below were sufficient for the Court of Appeals 
to make its initial determination to overturn the trial court and are sufficient for 
this Court to make a determination on the present record. The opinion does not 
evidence that facts were overlooked or misapprehended - it merely confirms that 
the Cross-Respondent simply did not meet its evidentiary burden. The lower Court 
did not rule that law was overlooked. Instead, it affirmed its prior legal rulings 
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with the exception of reserving on the issue of consent. The opinion resulting from 
the rehearing contradicts the prior opinion by stating that the findings were now 
found to be insufficient, when they were not in the first instance and are not 
presently. The Cross-Respondent has never argued to the Court of Appeals that 
the findings were not sufficient for appellate review. Rehearing was therefore 
inappropriate. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REMANDED THE 
CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. IN DOING SO IT 
RENDERED AN OPINION WHICH WAS INCONSISTENT AND 
ALLOWED AN ISSUE, WAIVED BY THE CROSS-RESPONDENT 
IN THE TRIAL COURT, TO BE EXAMINED FOR THE FIRST 
TIME. 
The Court of Appeals' second opinion did not modify any of the legal rulings 
made on the issues raised on appeal in this case. Despite the Appellate Court's 
ability to render its first decision based on the findings on the record, that Court 
subsequently determined that it did not have a sufficient record to decide the issue 
of consent. Additionally the lower court decided that the issue of abandonment, 
which was never raised until the appeal, needed to be explored. 
"Upon a re-examination of the record we agree with the 
State that the parties and the trial judge did not focus on 
the critical issue of the search of the suitcases at the 
motion to suppress hearing. The result is that the trial 
judge did not make adequate findings of fact on the 
issues of voluntary consent to search the trunk or the 
suitcases and Mr. Marshall's alleged abandonment of any 
privacy interest in the suitcases which the parties now 
agree are pivotal on appeal. We therefore remand for a 
rehearing on these issues. 
State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 at 49. (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
Cross-Petitioner asserts that any remand for the purposes of further 
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proceedings on the record is both unnecessary and improper, given the status of 
the record in this case. 
A. THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS WERE SUFFICIENT 
FOR THE APPELLATE COURT TO DETERMINE THE 
ISSUE. 
The trial judge made a findings of fact that "the defendant consented to the 
search. There was no evidence of duress or coercion." (R. 89) There is nothing 
in the lengthy record of this case that would preclude the Court of Appeals from 
making a determination that that finding was erroneous as they did in the first 
opinion. All of the facts necessary to determine the legal issues were developed 
within the record. It is the State's burden to show a warrantless search is lawful. 
State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). What that record clearly 
demonstrates though, is that the State failed to meet its burden of proving there 
was voluntary consent to search the suitcases, even by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The lower court's initial ruling that the State had failed to prove 
consent was appropriate and capable of being rendered from the record. The trial 
court judge's determination to the contrary was erroneous, and remand for further 
findings is unnecessary. 
B. REMANDING THE CASE FOR FURTHER HEARING IS 
INAPPROPRIATE. 
It is unclear from the lower court's ruling whether the court remanded for 
further evidentiary hearing. It is clear, however, from the ruling of the court, that 
the Court of Appeals expected a determination of an issue never presented by the 
State in the lower court. 
. . . therefore we reverse and remand this interlocutory 
appeal for rehearing on Mr. Marshall's motion to 
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suppress on a limited issues of whether Mr. Marshall 
voluntarily consented to the search of the trunk or the 
suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall abandoned any privacy 
interest in the suitcases and thus lacks standing to 
challenge their search and finally, if the trial court finds 
there was an illegal search of the trunk or suitcases, 
whether there is sufficient nexus between that illegal 
search and Mr. Marshall's abandonment, if any, of his 
expectation of privacy in the suitcases." 
State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 at 50-51 (Utah. Ct. App. 1990) 
The Court, in this opinion, was not specific as to whether or not further 
evidence needed to be taken, which the Cross-Petitioner asserts leaves the matter 
open inappropriately. 
The trial court did not make adequate findings on voluntary consent to 
search the suitcases, or that there was an inadequate finding as to the 
abandonment of any privacy issue to justify a remand. As argued to the Appellate 
Court in its Answer to Petition for Rehearing and Reply Brief to the Respondent's 
brief, the Respondent did not raise the issue of abandonment in the lower court 
and it is therefore inappropriate to have directed the lower court to address it 
now. The only basis ever argued to justify the search was consent. Remanding for 
a determination of abandonment is inappropriate. 
The Court justifies its direction by stating "the parties now agree that issue 
is pivotal on appeal". That finding by the Court is absolutely erroneous. Cross-
Petitioner has persisted in the argument that abandonment, as well as standing, 
having not been raised as an issue in the trial court, can not, and should not be 
raised on appeal. This issue was never argued in the trial court, either at the 
Suppression Hearing or in briefs submitted to the trial court. Consent was all that 
was relied upon. Cross-Petitioner has consistently relied on the rule that a new 
10 
issue cannot be raised on appeal. It is not now, nor has it ever been a pivotal issue 
to this case. Cross-Petitioner asserts that a remand a determination of that issue 
in the lower court, when it was neither raised nor argued in the trial court, is 
inappropriate. The lower court' decision then, if allowed to stand, authorizes 
consideration anew of an issue not raised below and apparently abandoned by the 
State before the trial court. 
Given the record in this matter, to suggest that any further hearings ought 
to be conducted in this case, is both patently unfair and improper, particularly 
when the State's counsel abandoned or conceded the issue below. What the Court 
of Appeals' amended decision effectively proposes is that the State, having failed 
to build its record in the trial court and having failed to raise the arguments that 
they claim the facts may have supported, should be given a chance to correct the 
record for its own purposes and to the prejudice of the Cross-Petitioner. 
C. THE LIMITED ISSUES REMANDED FOR 
DETERMINATION ARE INAPPROPRIATE. 
The lower court remanded the case for hearing on the following limited 
issues: 
First, whether or not Mr. Marshall voluntarily consented to the search of the 
trunk or the suitcases was erroneous. The trial court made a determination that 
there was Consent. That determination was not supported by the record, as the 
initial opinion of the Court of Appeals verifies. Reopening the record and 
requesting additional findings would not cure that problem. 
Cross-Petitioner does not concede that the Court of Appeals' initial 
determination that the search of the trunk was consensual. The record does not 
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establish consent. 
Legally, the officer was without authority to request the search because it 
was done so after the warning ticket was issued and there was no other suspicious 
evidence warranting a detention. Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-167 (1953 as amended) 
is a forthwith release statute. It provides that the officer is to give written notice 
to appear on motor vehicle code violations. If the person signs a written promise 
to appear, and the officer has no reason to believe the individual will not appear 
or pay the ticket - he is to "forthwith release the person arrested from custody". 
Failure to do so is a crime. A person stopped and detained for a problem 
warranting only a warning ticket is certainly entitled to the benefit of that 
provision. The officer's further questioning of the Cross-Petitioner in this case, 
was outside his legal authority thereby violating any purported consent. 
Additionally, this officer never advised the Cross-Petitioner that he did not 
have to consent. Cross-Petitioner asserts that Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution should be interpreted to require informed consent. 
Further, Mr. Marshall was directed to open the trunk, not asked. There was, 
therefore, no factual consent. The State also never established, on the record, that 
the voluntariness standards of U. S. v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977) were 
met. 
The Court of Appeals initially correctly determined that the State had failed 
to meet its burden of proving any consent in connection with the suitcases. Any 
consent to the trunk did not encompass the suitcases and was beyond its scope. 
U.S. v. Gay, 11A F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 
201 (Colo. 1984) 
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Second, the Court of Appeals remands for the purposes of determining 
whether Mr. Marshall abandoned any privacy interest in the suitcases and thereby 
lacked standing to challenge their search. A remand for that purpose is 
inconsistent with the Court's ruling in the first part of its opinion where the Court 
stated that the State should be precluded from raising the issue of standing on 
appeal because of their failure to raise it in the trial court. It is without logic then 
to remand this matter so that there can be a trial court proceeding with direction 
that those issues be developed and addressed. Having failed to raise either 
abandonment or standing in the trial court, it is not appropriate to remand to the 
trial court only for the purposes of allowing the State to cure its error. 
Third, the remand for a determination as to whether or not there was an 
illegal search of the trunk or suitcases, and if so, whether there is a sufficient 
nexus between the illegal search and Mr. Marshall's abandonment, once again, is 
merely giving the State the opportunity to address an issue which they waived by 
failing to argue it to the trial court. 
The Court of Appeal's decision to remand for further examination of the 
above-stated issues is not only inconsistent with its ruling on the State's burden to 
assert standing and prove consent, but effectively establishes a different standard 
for the State than a defendant in a criminal matter. If the opinion were allowed 
to stand, this Court would be condoning this double standard. Defendant's cannot 
raise new issues on appeal, but the State, if they fail to raise issues, is entitled to 
reopen the trial court record and have a second opportunity. 
Further, the opinion ignores the burdens placed on the State when a 
warrantless search is challenged. The State's failure to take advantage of an 
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opportunity to argue the issues that they claim the facts may have developed 
should preclude them from being allowed in a remand situation to go back and 
attempt to cure any perceived error. This Court can and should determine from 
the record that the prior Court of Appeals' initial opinion regarding consent to 
search the suitcases was correct and that the State failed to meet its burden to 
prove consent otherwise, even by a preponderance of evidence, under applicable 
case law. 
POINT HI 
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE 
D E T E N T I O N OF T H E C R O S S - P E T I T I O N E R WAS 
CONSTITUTIONAL, WAS ERRONEOUS. 
In both opinions, the Court of Appeals ruled "we find that Trooper Avery's 
questioning of Mr. Marshall as to conduct unrelated to the traffic stop was 
justified because he had reason to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged in a more 
serious crime." State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 at 47. This matter 
involved a stop that was based solely on the failure of a blinker light to turn off 
within a period of time satisfactory to the officer. The officer, thereupon 
conducted a fishing expedition before and after a warning ticket was given to the 
Defendant which was not related to the traffic investigation nor supported by any 
reasonable suspicion. 
Under the Fourth Amendment and applicable Constitution law, even if there 
is an arguably proper stop of a vehicle for a traffic offense there must be probable 
cause to detain the individual for investigation beyond the traffic violation. Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); U.S. v. Gonzales, 763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985); 
U.S. v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). Recently, in U.S. v. Walker, 
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No. 90-CR-013, (D. Utah 1990) (granting motion to suppress) the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah ruled that asking questions about alcohol, 
drugs and firearms, at the conclusion of a traffic investigation, constituted an 
illegal detention if there was not evidence of the same. 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-162 (1953 as 
amended), upon signing of an promise to appear, further detention by an officer 
is illegal. That provision should equally apply in this case, where only a warning 
citation was issued. 
Appellant submits that the criteria relied upon by the officer to validate his 
detention does not support a finding of probable cause to continue to detain and 
question the Cross-Appellant about unrelated matters, nor detain for the purposes 
of requesting a search. 
POINT IV 
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE STOP 
OF THE CROSS-PETITIONER WAS LEGAL WAS ERRONEOUS. 
In both its original and amended opinion, the Court of Appeals ruled that 
the stop of Defendant's vehicle was proper in that the stop was not pretextual and 
was justified because the officer believed the vehicle's safety equipment was not 
functioning properly. State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 at 46-47. 
Cross-Appellant submits there was no crime committed in the officer's 
presence to meet the criteria of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended) -
a stop incident to a traffic violation. There exists no statute in the State of Utah 
which states it is a crime or an offense of any kind to fail to turn off a turn signal. 
The facts of this case do not support any finding that the turn signal failure in this 
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case constituted another traffic violation. 
Cross-Appellant further submits that Article I Section 1, Article I Section 
7, Article I Section 27, and Article I Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, dictate 
that under the circumstances of this case less intrusive means than a stop and 
detention were mandated given the fact no statute was or could have been relied 
upon for the stop. 
In both opinions, the Court of Appeals concluded "unlike the officer in 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 792 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) Trooper Avery was not 
suspicious of Mr. Marshall for other reasons. . ." The court then concluded that 
the stop of the Cross-Petitioner was not pretextual. The record is replete with 
facts that the arresting officer relied on which facts are the same type of improper 
criteria present in Sierra, supra. This improper criteria and the officer's "hunch" 
validated his continual investigation of the Cross-Petitioner. The finding that the 
stop was not pretextual and was warranted in both of the Court of Appeals' 
opinion, is erroneous. 
POINT V 
IF LEGAL CONSENT IS FOUND THE CONSENT WAS 
EXPLOITED FROM THE ILLEGAL STOP AND/OR DETENTION 
AND WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE 
PRIOR ILLEGALITY TO RENDER THE EVIDENCE 
ADMISSIBLE. 
Under U.S. v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 at 1457-1458 (10th Cir. 1985), if a 
consent search results from an illegal stop or detention, the consent must be 
examined under the following rule: 
In the context of voluntary consent, we hold that 
'exploitation of the primary illegality' means that the 
police used the fruits of the primary illegality to coerce 
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the defendant into granting his consent. 
We also hold that in the context of voluntary consent, the 
'sufficiently distinguishable' standard in Wong Sun 
refers to means of obtaining evidence substantially 
independent of the prior illegality. United States v. 
Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 at 1149. (10th Cir. 1986) 
Defendant submits that the officer's illegal and pretextual stop and illegal 
detention for further questioning beyond the scope of the traffic violation - in 
order to confirm the officer's "hunch" or "gut instinct" - made any consent tainted 
and ineffective. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals has rendered an amended opinion in this matter which 
is inherently inconsistent. A remand for a determination of issues abandoned by 
the State in the trial court and not raised until appeal is a departure outside the 
accepted and usual course of procedures. The amended opinion is in conflict with 
the first opinion rendered and therefore this Court should render a decision 
resolving the same by affirming the first opinion on the issues of consent and 
standing or ruling the search was illegal on the basis stated in this Cross-Petition. 
/ $f 
/RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^/ day of May, 1990. 
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES 
LOLD D. McPHEE KKlSTINE K^SMITH ~ 
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There was no agreement by the Joan Cingo-
lani plaintiffs to redeposit their shares with the 
district court in the event the Anna Cingolani 
plaintiffs successfully challenged the judgment 
and order of distribution on appeal, and there 
was no agreement by the Anna Cingolani 
plaintiffs to do the same if the Joan Cingolani 
plaintiffs successfully challenged the judgment 
and order of distribution in their appeal. With 
regard to the attorney fee claim, Anna and 
GWWB did not seek a stay of the September 
22, 1988, order distributing one-third of the 
Joan Cingolani plaintiffs' recovery to HLP. 
Instead, Anna and GWWB acquiesced in the 
clerk's disbursement of the full contingent fee 
to HLP in accordance with Judge Harding's 
order and did not obtain any agreement from 
HLP to redeposit those funds with the district 
court if Anna prevailed in this court on the 
attorney fee distribution claim. 
As a result of these actions by the parties 
and Anna's counsel, the issues raised in both 
appeals are moot. There is no longer any set-
tlement money on deposit with the clerk of the 
district court, and there is no basis on which 
either the trial court or a party successful on 
appeal could compel the other party's return 
of the disbursed funds to the district court for 
redistribution. In short, even if we were to 
agree with one of the appellants on the settl-
ement distribution claim or with Anna and 
GWWB on the attorney fee distribution claim, 
we could not afford any relief to the succes-
sful appellant. See Black, 656 P.2d at 410. 
Appellants have not raised, and we do not 
perceive, any issues of public interest, see 
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 
1981), or any other extraordinary circumsta-
nces constituting an exception to the mootness 
doctrine, see Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
33, that would justify our consideration of the 
merits of these moot appeals. We therefore 
dismiss both appeals, with the parties to bear 
their own costs. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
John Farr Larson, Judge 
1. John Fair Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting 
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
2. Although technically an appellee in both cases, 
Utah Power & Light Company is not an active 
participant in either appeal because the two groups 
of appellants are fighting with each other over the 
distribution of the settlement to which all appellants 
agreed. 
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Petition for Interlocutory Appeal 
AMENDED OPINION* 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr. 
Marshair), was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distri-
bute for value, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 
(1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pretrial motion to 
suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized 
from the rental car he was driving when he 
was arrested. The trial court denied Mr. 
Marshall's motion and he filed this interloc-
utory appeal. We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure 
of the contraband in detail as the legal issues 
presented are fact sensitive. State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery 
("Trooper Avery") was driving on Interstate 
70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Mars-
hall's vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a 
motor home. Trooper Avery observed that 
Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking 
for approximately two miles after he passed 
the motor home. Not knowing whether Mr. 
Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or 
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the 
signal on, Trooper Avery pulled the vehicle 
over to inform Mr. Marshall of the problem 
and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper 
Avery had issued similar warning citations for 
turn signal violations approximately five to ten 
times in the previous six-month period. 
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Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall, Trooper 
Avery noticed the vehicle had California 
license plates. He approached Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn 
signal problem. Mr. Marshall responded that 
he had been having "a hard time keeping the 
thing turned off." 
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his 
driver's license and vehicle registration. Mr. 
Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement for 
the vehicle. Mr. Marshall said he was going 
skiing in Denver and planned to return the car 
to San Diego, California. However, the rental 
agreement indicated that the car would be 
returned in New York in five days. 
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became 
suspicious that Mr. Marshall might be trans-
porting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car 
where he issued a warning citation for "Lights, 
head, tail, other." Trooper Avery then retu-
rned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the 
rental agreement. 
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if 
he was carrying alcohol, drugs or firearms. 
Mr. Marshall stated he was not. Trooper 
Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could 
"look inside the vehicle." Mr. Marshall resp-
onded, "Go ahead." Trooper Avery and Mr. 
Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle. The passenger door was locked and 
Mr. Marshall reached in on the driver's side 
to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a 
small red bag on the floor of the vehicle and 
asked if he could open it. Mr. Marshall 
agreed. No contraband was found inside the 
bag or the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle. 
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall 
had a key to the trunk and if Mr. Marshall 
would open the trunk. Mr„ Marshall attempted 
to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly 
that Trooper Avery had to assist him by 
holding the key latch cover up while Mr. 
Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw 
four padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall 
opened the trunk. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr. 
Marshall responded "clothes." Trooper Avery 
then asked if he could look in the suitcases. 
Mr. Marshall immediately reversed his state-
ment and responded that the suitcases were 
not his and must have already been in the 
trunk when he rented the vehicle. Trooper 
Avery testified there was some play in the 
zipper of one bag and he unzipped it far 
enough to see a green leafy substance. Trooper 
Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for posses-
sion of a controlled substance. 
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any 
evidence to contradict Trooper Avery's testi-
mony during the hearing below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[W]e will not disturb the trial court's 
factual evaluation underlying its decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress unless it is 
clearly erroneous." State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 
972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Further, "[t]he trial court's 
finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against 
the clear weight of the evidence or if [the 
appellate court] reach [es] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." State 
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) 
requires the trial court to state its findings on 
the record "[w]here factual issues are involved 
in determining a motion." Those findings must 
be sufficiently detailed in order to allow us the 
opportunity to adequately review the decision 
below.1 
PRETEXT STOP 
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper 
Avery used the fact that his turn signal was 
malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his vehicle 
to search for evidence of drug trafficking. 
The protective shield of the fourth amend-
ment applies when an officer stops an auto-
mobile on the highway and detains its occup-
ants. Stare v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). A police officer may constit-
utionally stop a citizen on two alternative 
grounds. First, the stop "could be based on 
specific, articulable facts which, together with 
rational inferences drawn from those facts, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
[defendant] had committed or was about to 
commit a crime." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Christensen, 
676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Tru-
jillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
Second, the police officer can "stop an auto-
mobile for a traffic violation committed in the 
officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. 
However, an officer may not use a traffic 
violation stop as a pretext to search for evid-
ence of a more serious crime. Id. 
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. 
Marshall's vehicle to investigate his hunch 
that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved in 
drug trafficking, we determine whether a 
hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the 
totality of the circumstances confronting him 
or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to 
issue a warning for failing to terminate a turn 
signal. Id. at 978. 
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop 
of his vehicle is similar to the stop we found 
unconstitutional in Sierra. We disagree. In 
Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was 
that the driver remained in the left lane too 
long after passing a car. In this case, Trooper 
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Avery perceived an equipment problem with 
Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was 
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to 
turn it off.2 Courts consistently have held that 
a police officer can stop a vehicle when he or 
she believes the vehicle's safety equipment is 
not functioning properly.3 
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra, 
Trooper Avery was not suspicious of Mr. 
Marshall for other reasons before the stop, 
had not followed him in order to find some 
reason to pull him over, and, before the 
alleged violation occurred, had not radioed for 
help thereby indicating he intended to stop the 
vehicle. 
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's 
stop of Mr. Marshall's vehicle was not a 
pretext, but was a valid exercise of police 
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle was functioning properly. 
UNREASONABLE DETENTION 
Next, Mr. Marshall complains that the 
extent of his detention and the scope of 
Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded con-
stitutional limits.4 
"[I]n determining whether the seizure and 
search were 'unreasonable' our inquiry is a 
dual one-whether the officer's action was 
justified at its inception, and whether it was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumsta-
nces which justified the interference in the first 
place/ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 
(1968). 
We have previously found that Trooper 
Avery's traffic stop of Mr. Marshall was 
justified. The remaining question is whether 
Trooper Avery's subsequent detention and 
questioning of Mr. Marshall was reasonably 
related to the initial traffic stop or was justi-
fied because Trooper Avery had a reasonable 
suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged 
in a more serious crime. United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 
1988). 
The United States Supreme Court has not 
chosen to define a bright-line rule as to the 
acceptable length of a detention because 
"common sense and ordinary human experi-
ence must govern over rigid criteria." United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). 
The Court has chosen to focus, not on the 
length of the detention alone, but on "whether 
the police diligently pursued a means of inve-
stigation that was likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly, during which time it 
was necessary to detain the defendant." Id. at 
686. 
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning cita-
tion within ten minutes of stopping Mr. 
Marshall and then returned Mr. Marshall's 
driver's license and the vehicle rental agree-
ment. Trooper Avery claims that as a result of 
his examination of Mr. Marshall's driver's 
license and the vehicle rental agreement and 
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his brief conversation with Mr. Marshall, he 
became suspicious that Mr. Marshall was 
involved in drug trafficking. Specifically, 
Trooper Avery points to the fact that Mr. 
Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement for 
the vehicle. When questioned about the rental 
agreement, Mr. Marshall said he was going 
skiing in Colorado and planned to return the 
car to San Diego, California. However, the 
rental agreement indicated the car was to be 
returned to New York in five days, the appr-
oximate time it takes to drive directly from 
California to New York. In addition, Mr. 
Marshall was driving along a well-known 
drug trafficking route. 
As a result of his suspicion, Trooper Avery 
then asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying 
weapons, alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Mr. 
Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper 
Avery allegedly asked for permission to look 
into the vehicle and received Mr. Marshall's 
consent. 
The trial judge found that Trooper Avery's 
"investigation was reasonable in view of the 
defendant's statements in regards to the 
vehicle ownership and the driver's usage. The 
destination itinerary would have put a reaso-
nable officer on notice that something was 
wrong." Although not directly so stating, the 
judge, in substance, concluded that Trooper 
Avery had reasonable suspicion to believe that 
Mr. Marshall was involved in illegal conduct. 
Although it is a close call, we agree with the 
trial court's assessment of the reasonableness 
of the detention. 
We find that Trooper Avery's questioning 
of Mr. Marshall as to conduct unrelated to the 
traffic stop was justified because he had rea-
sonable suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was 
engaged in a more serious crime. See Guzman, 
864F.2datl519. 
In conclusion, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, we agree with the trial court 
that Trooper Avery's ten-minute detention 
and brief questioning of Mr. Marshall prior to 
Mr. Marshall's alleged consent to search the 
vehicle was not an unreasonable detention. 
SEARCH 
On appeal, Mr. Marshall argues that even if 
his initial stop and subsequent detention were 
not constitutionally deficient, the subsequent 
search of the trunk of the vehicle and the 
suitcases found in the trunk without a warrant 
violated his fourth amendment rights. The 
state contends, on the other hand, that Mr. 
Marshall consented to the search of the trunk 
and abandoned any privacy interest in the 
suitcases and thus Trooper Avery's search of 
the suitcases was constitutionally permissible.5 
In our prior opinion, we focused solely on 
whether the search of the suitcases was proper. 
We found the warrantless search of the suitc-
ases unconstitutional as we refused to allow 
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the state to raise the issue of fourth amend-
ment standing for the first time on appeal. We 
granted the state's petition for rehearing to re-
examine the related fourth amendment issues 
of voluntary consent and abandonment which 
are central to a resolution of this appeal. 
1. Standing 
The state, in its original brief on appeal, 
claimed Mr. Marshall was without standing to 
challenge the seizure of the suitcases as he had 
disclaimed any ownership or possessory inte-
rest in the suitcases during the search and thus 
had no expectation of privacy in their cont-
ents. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-
50 (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 
1335 (Utah 1984); State v. Grueber, 116 P.2d 
70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Stare v. 
DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). The state relies upon the following 
testimony from the preliminary hearing: 
Q. [Defense Counsel] And what 
was inside the trunk? 
A. [Trooper Avery] There were 
four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look 
in those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of 
all, I asked him what was in the 
suitcases, and he told me, right 
quickly, clothes. Then when I 
looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they 
came from, they must have been in 
there when he rented the car. 
In our prior opinion, we relied on the Utah 
Supreme Court decision of State v. Schlosser, 
11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), which squarely 
held that standing to challenge the validity of 
a search under the fourth amendment "is not a 
jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a substantive 
doctrine that identifies those who may assert 
rights against unlawful searches and seizures." 
Id. at 1138. Citing the general rule that a 
substantive issue or "claim of error cannot be 
raised for the first time on appeal," the 
supreme court deemed the issue of standing 
waived. Id. at 1138-39. 
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, 
claiming that in that case the state not only 
failed to raise the issue of standing in the 
motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal 
and that here, unlike Schlosser, the state raises 
standing simply as an alternative ground to 
uphold the trial court's denial of the motion 
to suppress.6 We do not find the distinction 
determinative.7 
The United States Supreme Court took the 
same position in Steagald v. United States, 451 
U.S. 204 (1981), when it refused to allow the 
government to raise the issue of fourth ame-
ndment standing for the first time on appeal 
to provide an alternative ground to sustain the 
trial court's refusal to grant a motion to 
suppress. The Court concluded: 
Aside from arguing that a search 
warrant was not constitutionally 
required, the Government was ini-
tially entitled to defend against 
petitioner's charge of an unlawful 
search by asserting that petitioner 
lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the searched home, or 
that he consented to the search, or 
that exigent circumstances justified 
the entry . The Government, 
however, may lose its right to raise 
factual issues of this sort before this 
Court when it has made contrary 
assertions in the courts below, when 
it has acquiesced in contrary find-
ings by those courts, or when it has 
failed to raise such questions in a 
timely fashion during the litigation. 
Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
The state, on petition for rehearing, cont-
ends that language in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128 (1978) is contrary to our conclusion 
that the state should not be allowed to raise 
standing for the first time on appeal. We dis-
agree. The language in Rakas relied upon by 
the state is consistent with our view. 
The proponent of a motion to 
suppress has the burden of establi-
shing that his own Fourth Amend-
ment rights were violated by the 
challenged search or seizure. The pro-
secutor argued that petitioners 
lacked standing to challenge the 
search because they did not own the 
rifle, the shells or the automobile. Peti-
tioners did not contest the 
factual predicates of the prosec-
utor's argument and instead, simply 
stated that they were not required 
to prove ownership to object to the 
search. The prosecutor's argument 
gave petitioners notice that they 
were to be put to their proof on any 
issue as to which they had the 
burden, and because of their failure 
to assert ownership, we must 
assume, for purposes of our review, 
that petitioners do not own the rifle 
or the shells. 
Id. at 130 n.l (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
We agree with the state and Rakas that Mr. 
Marshall has the ultimate burden of proof to 
establish that his fourth amendment rights 
were violated or, to put it otherwise, that he 
had an expectation of privacy in the area 
searched or the articles seized.8 Nevertheless, 
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable 
and the burden is on the state, in the first 
instance, to show that a warrantless search is 
lawful. State v. Christensen, 616 P.2d 408, 411 
(Utah 1984). 
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We believe Rakas is consistent with our view 
hat the prosecutor, as part of the state's 
jurden to establish the constitutionality of a 
warrantless search, must give a defendant 
"notice that he will be put to his proof" on the 
ssue of fourth amendment standing. This can 
oe done at any time during the hearing on a 
defendant's motion to suppress as long as the 
defendant has an opportunity to put on evid-
ence to meet the claim.9 Once the defendant 
tias been put on notice that the state claims 
the warrantless search was constitutional 
because he has no expectation of privacy in 
the area searched, then the defendant must 
factually demonstrate that he does have stan-
ding to contest the warrantless search. We 
believe the Schlosser standing rule was fashi-
Dned to protect the defendant from being 
required to deal with new legal issues on 
appeal when he had no warning of the neces-
sity to develop the relevant facts below. 
2. Consent/ Abandonment 
The state, on petition for rehearing, excuses 
its failure to raise the issue of standing clai-
ming that neither Mr, Marshall, the state nor 
the trial judge focused on the search of the 
suitcases in the motion to suppress hearing. 
Rather, the state claims the hearing centered 
on the pretextual nature of the stop, the unr-
easonable detention of Mr. Marshall and the 
unlawful search of the trunk. 
Mr. Marshall, on petition for rehearing, 
claims the following comment made by 
defense counsel sufficiently focused the proc-
eeding on the search of the suitcases: 
"Additionally there is no evidence that there 
was consent to search the bags." 
Upon a re-examination of the record, we 
agree with the state that the parties and the 
trial judge did not focus on the critical issue 
of the search of the suitcases at the motion to 
suppress hearing. The result is that the trial 
judge did not make adequate findings of fact 
on the issues of voluntary consent to search 
the trunk or the suitcases and Mr. Marshall's 
alleged abandonment of any privacy interest in 
the suitcases, which the parties now agree are 
pivotal on appeal. We therefore remand for a 
rehearing on these critical issues. We nevert-
heless discuss the controlling law to guide the 
trial court on rehearing. 
A search is valid under the fourth amend-
ment if it is conducted as a result of the def-
endant's voluntary consent. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, All U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. 
Sierra, ISA P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). "[T]he question {of] whether a consent 
to a search was in fact 'voluntary* or was the 
product of duress or coercion, express or 
implied, is a question of fact to be determined 
from the totality of all the circumstances." 
Schneckloth, All U.S. at 227. "A trial court's 
finding of voluntary consent will not be reve-
rsed unless it is clearly erroneous." United 
States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir. 
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1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979). 
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 
(10th Cir. 1977), the Tenth Circuit outlined 
the specifics necessary for the government to 
sustain its burden to show that voluntary 
consent was given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and 
"freely and intelligently given"; (2) 
the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coer-
cion, express or implied; and (3) the 
courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights 
and there must be convincing evid-
ence that such rights were waived. 
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 
310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)). See also 
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453 
(10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whit-
tenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State 
v. Sierra, ISA P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents 
to a search, the ensuing search must be limited 
in scope to only the specific area agreed to by 
defendant. "The scope of a consent search is 
limited by the breadth of the actual consent 
itself .... Any police activity that transcends 
the actual scope of the consent given encroa-
ches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
suspect." United States v. Gay, 77A F.2d 368, 
377 (10th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., People v. 
Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope 
of consent exceeded when police asked to 
"look around" the house, then conducted a 45-
minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and 
closed containers). 
The trial court made the following conclu-
sory finding on the issue of Mr. Marshall's 
consent: "The Defendant consented to the 
search. There was no evidence of duress or 
coercion." This conclusory finding on consent 
is not particularly helpful in determining 
whether Mr. Marshall's consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" as it does not detail 
what Mr. Marshall agreed could be searched— 
the interior of the passenger compartment, the 
trunk, or the locked suitcases.10 Furthermore, 
the relevant portions from the transcript of 
Trooper Avery's testimony are troubling: 
Q. [Defense Counsel] What were 
the words he [sic] used when you 
asked him to search his vehicle? 
A. [Trooper Avery] I asked Mr. 
Marshall if—if there were any-
if there was any-were there any 
drugs in the vehicle, and he took 
two or three seconds-no, wait a 
minute, I guess-I first asked him 
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if he was carrying any weapons and 
he told me no. I then asked him if 
he was carrying any-if there was 
any alcohol in the vehicle, he said 
that he did not drink. I recall both 
answers were quite quick. And then 
I asked him if there were any drugs 
in the vehicle, he paused for, you 
know, probably two or three 
seconds, and then told me no. I 
then asked him if it would be okay 
if I looked in the vehicle, search the 
vehicle, and he said go ahead. 
Q. Now, did you ask if you could 
look in the vehicle, or did you ask 
if you could search the vehicle? 
A. Well, according to this [his 
report], I said-I asked if I could 
look in the vehicle. 
Q. So, it was "look in the vehicle"? 
You didn't ask if you could open 
anything inside the vehicle or any-
thing else, did you? 
A. No. I just asked if I could look 
in the vehicle. 
Q. And what happened then? 
A. Mr. Marshall just told me, you 
know, he said go right ahead. He 
got out, gathered up his papers and 
we walked up to the front of the 
vehicle, and he had to open the 
passenger door, as I recall. 
Q. And how did you get in the 
trunk? 
A. I asked him, I said-asked 
him if he had the key to the trunk 
and he says yes, and I says—and 
I asked him if he'[d] open it, which 
he did, he tried. He was extremely 
nervous at the time. I— 
Q. So did you open the trunk? 
A. No, sir, I did not. He-he 
could not-there was a little latch 
over the key hole. He was shaking 
so hard, he couldn't even hold the 
latch open, so I held the latch up 
for him so he could insert the key. 
Without the assistance of specific findings 
of fact, we cannot resolve the difficult issue of 
whether Mr. Marshall's opening the trunk 
constituted implied consent to search the trunk 
under the totality of the circumstances prese-
nted. See United States v. Almand, 565 F.2d 
927, 930 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 824 
(1978) (voluntary consent found where defe-
ndant silently reached into his pocket, 
removed key, then unlocked and opened 
camper door). 
Furthermore, the record creates a substan-
tial question as to whether the court's general 
finding that there was "no evidence of duress 
or coercion" was intended to apply to the 
search of the trunk or, even if it was, whether 
UTAH 
the finding is consistent with the standard 
required for a voluntary consent. See United 
States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 
1977); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Likewise, the court in 
its findings fails to focus on the search of the 
locked suitcases and the issues of voluntary 
consent or abandonment. 
Even if we were to accept the state's argu-
ment that the undisputed facts support a 
finding that Mr. Marshall abandoned11 any 
expectation of privacy in the suitcases by his 
ambiguous disclaimer of ownership and that 
the state should be allowed to raise this fourth 
amendment standing issue for the first time on 
appeal, we would be unable to dispose of this 
case on the record before us. The state, in its 
petition for rehearing, correctly points out that 
"a loss of standing to challenge a search 
cannot be brought about by illegal police 
conduct." United States v. Labat, 696 F. 
Supp. 1419,1425 (D. Kan. 1988). 
Thus, we would have to determine if the 
search of the trunk was illegal or was a result 
of a voluntary consent. This we cannot do on 
the record before us. 
Even if we determined the search of the 
trunk was unlawful, the "defendant must show 
a nexus between the allegedly unlawful police 
conduct and the abandonment of the prop-
erty." Id. at 1426. See, e.g., United States v. 
Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1982), cert, 
denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (While "an unc-
onstitutional seizure or arrest which prompts a 
disclaimer of property vitiates that act," id. at 
1045, the court found the defendant's discla-
imer was not precipitated by improper 
conduct. Id. at 1048.); United States v. 
Oilman, 684 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 1982) 
("There must be a nexus between the allegedly 
unlawful police conduct and abandonment of 
property if the challenged evidence is to be 
suppressed."); United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 
726, 730 (5th Cir. 1979) (if there is a nexus 
between unlawful police conduct and the dis-
covery of evidence, the court should suppress 
the evidence). See generally Search and 
Seizure: What Constitutes Abandonment of 
Personal Property within Rule that Search and 
Seizure of Abandoned Property Is Not Unre-
asonable-Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381 
(1985). Again, there is no finding on this 
crucial issue. 
Therefore, we reverse and remand this int-
erlocutory appeal for a rehearing on Mr. 
Marshall's motion to suppress on the limited 
issues of whether Mr. Marshall voluntarily 
consented to the search of the trunk or the 
suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall abandoned 
any privacy interest in the suitcases and thus 
lacks standing to challenge their search, and 
finally, if the trial court finds there was an 
illegal search of the trunk or suitcases, 
whether there is a sufficient nexus between 
that illegal search and Mr. Marshall's aban-
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donment, if any, of his expectation of privacy 
in the suitcases. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
•This opinion issued on Petition for Rehearing 
replaces the opinion of the same name issued 
on December 26, 1989. 
1. Utah appellate courts have consistently required 
detailed findings of fact to support a judgment 
entered by a trial judge in civil cases. Rucker v. 
Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979) ("The 
importance of complete, accurate and consistent 
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential 
to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of 
law. To that end the findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to dis-
close the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached/); Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah a . App. 
1989) (findings of fact must indicate the "mind of 
the court." (quoting Parlrs v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 673 P.2d 590,601 (Utah 1983)). 
Detailed findings of fact likewise greatly ease the 
burden of an appellate court in its review of a trial 
court's decision on a motion to suppress. This is 
particularly true where multiple issue are presented 
in the motion to suppress. 4 W. LaFave, Search & 
Seizure §11.2, at 252 (1987) [hereinafter "LaFave"] 
(citing State v. Johnson, 16 Or. App. 560, 519 P.2d 
1053, 1058-59 (1974)). Many jurisdictions require 
specific findings of fact on all motions to suppress. 
See LaFave at §11.2 n.188. We believe the requir-
ement a sound one. 
2. While the warning citation does not specify which 
provision of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, 
the state asserts that his conduct was in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-117(1) (1988) which, 
with our emphasis, provides: 
It is a misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for the owner to cause 
or knowingly permit to be driven or 
moved on any highway any vehicle or 
combination of vehicles which is in such 
unsafe condition as to endanger any 
person, or which does not contain those 
parts or is not at all times equipped with 
lamps and other equipment in proper 
condition and adjustment.... 
3. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 
(1979), the United States Supreme Court stated that 
an officer has a duty in the interest of highway 
safety to stop vehicles for safety reasons. "Many 
violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements 
are observable, and something can be done about 
them by the observing officer, directly and immed-
iately." Id. at 660. The Court inferred that as long 
as an officer suspects the driver is violating "any 
one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equi-
pment regulations," the police officer may legally 
stop the vehicle. Id. at 661. See Townsel v. State, 
763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court 
held stop justified when vehicle's headlight was out, 
a tail light was broken, the license plate and 
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. 
Puig, 112 Ariz. 519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) 
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(suspicion of defective turn signals justified stop); 
State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 1989) (stop 
justified when blinking headlights led officer to stop 
vehicle for safety reasons). 
4. We do not analyze this issue under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as the state 
constitutional issue was not sufficiently particular-
ized below nor is a reasoned analysis provided on 
appeal as to why our analysis should be different 
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson, 
111 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
5. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had 
probable cause to search either the car or the suitc-
ases. We, therefore, need not deal with the troubl-
esome issue of whether probable cause to search an 
automobile is sufficient under the automobile exce-
ption to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk 
of a car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798 (1982) (if probable cause exists, police can 
search closed containers found in vehicle); Arkansas 
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (warrantless search 
of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi invalid); 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) 
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the 
trunk of a vehicle invalid); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264, 272 n.l (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concur-
ring separately) (criticizing the Ross holding). 
6. Prior to Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court had, 
in several cases, considered standing for the first 
time on appeal and had utilized the doctrine to 
refuse to consider the constitutional validity of a 
challenged search. See, e.g., State v. Constantino, 
732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) 
(court did not address whether the issue of standing 
had been raised below, but stated that defendant 
could not assert any expectation of privacy in 
vehicle because he did not own vehicle and had 
presented no testimony that he had permission of 
owner or had borrowed vehicle "under circumsta-
nces that would imply permissive use"); State v. 
Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986) (State 
below argued there was consent by defendant's ex-
wife to search his mother's trailer. On appeal, the 
state argued defendant had no possessory or prop-
rietary interest in the trailer and thus had no expe-
ctation of privacy. The court declined to reach the 
issue of consent because it found that defendant 
lacked standing to object to the search because the 
stipulated evidence did not show that defendant 
shared ownership, use or possession of the trailer.); 
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984) 
(At trial, the defendant produced evidence that 
neither the attache case in which the evidence was 
found nor the vehicle belonged to the defendant. 
The court did not address whether the issue of sta-
nding was raised below, but declined to reach the 
question of the validity of the search because the 
defendant conceded he did not own the case or the 
vehicle and had failed to show any expectation of 
privacy.). In these earlier cases, it is sometimes 
unclear whether the Utah Supreme Court raised the 
issue of standing sua sponte on appeal or permitted 
the state to raise the issue of standing for the first 
time on appeal. We assume that Schlosser superc-
edes these earlier cases and thus do not follow them. 
7. Although the Utah Supreme Court refused to 
allow standing to be utilized to attack the trial 
court's granting of a motion to suppress in Schlo-
sser, the court relied on State v. Goodman, 42 
Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), which held 
the state could not raise the issue of standing for the 
first time on appeal to provide an alternative ground 
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for sustaining the trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress. Id. at 1060. 
8. However, the failure of the state to challenge Mr. 
Marshall's standing at the suppression hearing did 
not give Mr. Marshall an opportunity to assert his 
expectation of privacy. See Combs v. United States, 
408 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1972) (per curiam) (Where 
petitioner's failure to assert an expectation of 
privacy may have been explained by the Govern-
ment's failure to challenge standing either at the 
suppression hearing or at trial, the United States 
Supreme Court remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings to allow petitioner to establish a 
privacy interest.). 
9. The defendant's testimony at the motion to 
suppress hearing cannot be used against the defen-
dant at trial. See Simmons v. United States, 390 
U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (prosecutor cannot use a def-
endant's testimony at a suppression hearing as 
substantive evidence of guilt at trial unless defen-
dant makes no objection). We note, however, that 
the United States Supreme Court had not decided 
whether the Simmons rule precludes the use of a 
defendant's suppression hearing testimony to 
impeach the defendant's testimony at trial. See 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 94 & n.9 
(1980). 
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the importance of detailed findings on 
a motion to suppress. 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 
1173 (10th Cir. 1983) (Court found abandonment 
when police initially saw defendant running with a 
brown satchel, however, when they captured defe-
ndant, he did not have the satchel and disavowed 
knowledge of it. Police later found the satchel 
outside the building and searched it.); United States 
v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, 
denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982) (court found abandon-
ment where the defendant, after picking up the 
luggage at the claim area, produced a mismatched 
baggage claim check, told agents that his name was 
not on the luggage name tag, and allowed the agents 
to return the luggage to the claim area, thus giving 
the agents the impression that he had no interest in 
the luggage); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 
1217, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 
U.S. 946 (1982) (court found abandonment where 
the defendant disclaimed ownership of a wallet 
found on the seat of the vehicle); United States v. 
Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) 
(court found abandonment when defendants discl-
aimed ownership of suitcases and began to walk 
away from them). 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Carl N. SMITH and Dawna La Verne Smith, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 880661-CA 
FILED: April 19, 1990 
Seventh District, Duchesne County 
Honorable Dennis L. Draney 
ATTORNEYS: 
Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Robert W, Adkins and Terry L. Christiansen, 
Coalville, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Billings. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Plaintiffs/appellants Carl N. Smith and 
Dawna LaVerne Smith ("Smiths") appeal from 
a money judgment in their favor. The Smiths 
claim the trial court incorrectly assessed the 
damages due them as a result of the defendant/ 
appellee Linmar Energy Corporation's 
("Linmar Energy") placement of an oil well, 
battery storage tank, and road on the Smiths' 
property pursuant to an oil and gas lease. We 
affirm. 
The Smiths are owners of a fee interest in 
20 acres of land located adjacent to the city 
limits of Altamont in Duchesne County. 
Linmar Energy is the lessee under an oil and 
gas lease covering this property. The Smiths' 
20-acre tract, including the land now occu-
pied by the well site, has been used exclusively 
for agricultural purposes. The Smiths' prop-
erty is located in the Altamont-Bluebell oil 
field and is surrounded by numerous oil wells, 
some of which may be seen from the Smith 
property. 
In 1983, Linmar Energy, pursuant to its 
lease, entered onto the southwest corner of the 
Smiths' 20-acre parcel to install an oil well 
along with an oil well battery and storage 
tanks. Linmar Energy also constructed an 
access road from the county road on the north 
to the well site. Linmar Energy occupied 4.76 
acres of the 20-acre parcel. 
Linmar Energy considered several other 
alternative locations for the well site, but rej-
ected the other sites based on geological and 
economic factors. Prior to construction of the 
well site, Linmar Energy's representative 
contacted Carl Smith and met him on the 
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debt. 
Yoho states that his credit manager handled 
the document at issue, and that Yoho had 
never seen it until his deposition in this action. 
He does not, however, dispute Shillington's 
estimate of the date on which the guaranty 
agreement was executed. Yoho merely states 
that he discussed the financial arrangements 
with one of Shillington's employees, who said 
that Shillington had agreed to guaranty 
payment. Although Yoho never discussed the I 
agreement with Shillington personally, he 
insists that no goods would have been deliv-
ered to RTEM prior to such an agreement 
from Shillington. 
A review of this evidence in the light most 
favorable to Shillington indicates that the 
written guaranty was not executed until after 
the goods had been delivered. This leaves as a 
genuine question of material fact whether the 
document is merely a memorialization of a 
parol agreement made between the parties or 
their agents prior to the delivery of the goods, 
or a gratuitous promise made thereafter. 
Without a previous parol agreement, the 
signed document may be unenforceable. See 
Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 
633 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Events which 
occur prior to the making of the promise and 
not with the purpose of inducing the promise 
in exchange are viewed as 'past consideration* 
and are the legal equivalent of 'no consider-
ation.'") (quoting 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts §210 (1963)). 
Although the trial court did not articulate 
its reasoning behind the grant of summary 
judgment, only one material fact in dispute is 
required to reverse a summary judgment. See 
Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342, 343 (Utah 
1978). Since we hold that the existence of a 
parol agreement is one such unresolved mat-
erial fact, we reverse the summary judgment 
and remand the case for trial or other proce-
edings.2 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting 
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
2. We make no pronouncement on the applicability 
of the statute of frauds, Utah Code Ann. §§25-5-
4(2),-6 (Supp. 1989 & 1989), an issue not raised by 
the parties. 
Cite as 
124 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The STATE of Utah, 
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Jerold D. McPhee and Kristine K. Smith, Salt 
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Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and 
Jackson. 
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr. 
Marshall"), was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distri-
bute for value, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 
(1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pre-trial motion 
to suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana 
seized from the rental car he was driving when 
he was arrested. The trial court denied Mr. 
Marshall's motion and he filed this interloc-
utory appeal. We reverse. 
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure 
of the contraband in detail as the legal issues 
presented are fact sensitive. State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery 
("Trooper Avery") was driving on Interstate 
70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Mars-
hall's vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a 
motor home. Trooper Avery observed that 
Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking 
for approximately two miles after he passed 
the motor home. Not knowing whether Mr. 
Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or 
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the 
signal on, Trooper Avery pulled the vehicle 
over to inform Mr. Marshall of the problem 
and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper 
Avery had issued similar warning citations for 
turn signal violations approximately five to ten 
times in the previous six-month period. 
Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall, Trooper 
Avery noticed the vehicle had California 
license plates. He approached Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn 
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signal problem. Mr. Marshall responded that 
he had been having "a hard time keeping the 
thing turned off." 
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his 
driver's license and vehicle registration. Mr. 
Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement for 
the vehicle. Mr. Marshall said he was going 
siding in Denver and planned to return the car 
to San Diego, California. However, the rental 
agreement indicated that the car would be 
returned in New York in five days. 
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became 
suspicious that Mr. Marshall might be trans-
porting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car 
where he issued a warning citation for "Lights, 
head, tail, other." Trooper Avery then retu-
rned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the 
rental agreement. 
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if 
he was carrying alcohol, drugs or firearms. 
Mr. Marshall stated he was not. Trooper 
Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could 
"look inside the vehicle." Mr. Marshall resp-
onded, "Go anead." Trooper Avery and Mr. 
Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle. The passenger door was locked and 
Mr. Marshall reached in on the driver's side 
to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a 
small red bag on the floor of the vehicle and 
asked if he could open it. Mr. Marshall 
agreed. No contraband was found inside the 
bag or the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle. 
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall 
had a key to the trunk and if Mr. Marshall 
would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall attempted 
to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly 
that Trooper Avery had to assist him by 
holding the key latch cover up while Mr. 
Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw 
four padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall 
opened the trunk. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr. 
Marshall responded "clothes*" Trooper Avery 
then asked if he could look in the suitcases. 
Mr. Marshall immediately reversed his state-
ment and responded that the suitcases were 
not his and must have already been in the 
trunk when he, rented the vehicle. Trooper 
Avery testified there was some play in the 
zipper of one bag and he unzipped it far 
enough to see a green leafy substance. Trooper 
Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for posses-
sion of a controlled substance. 
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any 
evidence to contradict Trooper Avery's testi-
mony during the hearing below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[W]e will not disturb the trial court's 
factual evaluation underlying its decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress unless it is 
clearly erroneous." State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 
dv. Rep. 60 61 
972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Further, "[tjhe trial court's 
finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against 
the clear weight of the evidence or if [the 
appellate court] reach[es] a definite and firm 
conviction that-a mistake has been made." State 
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
STANDING-EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY 
The state argues that we need not reach the 
issues asserted by Mr. Marshall that Trooper 
Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall was an uncon-
stitutional pretext, or that his consequent 
detention exceeded constitutional limits, or 
that Mr. Marshall did not voluntarily consent 
to the search of the suitcases found in the 
trunk of his rental car. As a threshold argu-
ment, the state claims that Mr. Marshall lacks 
standing to challenge the seizure of the suitc-
ases as he disclaimed any ownership or poss-
essory interest in the suitcases both during the 
search and subsequent to his arrest and, thus, 
had no expectation of privacy in their cont-
ents.* See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-
50 (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 
1335 (Utah 1984); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 
70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
The fatal problem with the state's argument 
is the state raises standing for the first time on 
appeal. The Utah Supreme Court recently 
squarely held that standing to challenge the 
validity of a search under the fourth amend-
ment "is not a jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a 
substantive doctrine that identifies those who 
may assert rights against unlawful searches 
and seizures." State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 
1132, 1138 (Utah 1989). Citing the general rule 
that a substantive issue or "claim of error 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal," 
the court deemed the issue of standing waived. 
Id. at 1138-39. 
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, 
claiming that in Schlosser the state not only 
failed to raise the issue of standing in the 
motion to suppress hearing, but also on 
appeal. We do not find the distinction deter-
minative. We believe the Schlosser standing 
rule was fashioned to protect the defendant 
from being required to deal with new legal 
issues on appeal when he had no warning of 
the necessity to develop the relevant facts 
below. 
In this case, the state, the defendant, and 
the trial court all focused on the issue of vol-
untary consent to search the suitcases, not 
standing to assert a privacy interest in the 
suitcases. The defendant may well have chosen 
to testify at the motion to suppress hearing to 
contradict the trooper's testimony that he had 
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disclaimed ownership of the suitcases had the 
state chosen to litigate the issue of standing 
below. 
In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 
(1981), the United States Supreme Court also 
refused to allow the government to raise the 
issue of fourth amendment standing for the 
first time on appeal. The Court refused to 
allow the state to claim that the defendant had 
no expectation of privacy in the house sear-
ched as a ground for sustaining the lower 
court's ruling denying a motion to suppress 
when the state had not made this claim at 
trial. The Court concluded: 
The Government, however, may 
lose its right to raise factual issues 
of this sort before this Court when 
it has made contrary assertions in 
the courts below, when it has acq-
uiesced in contrary findings by 
those courts, or when it has failed 
to raise such questions in a timely 
fashion during the litigation. 
Id. at 209. 
Thus, we conclude that the state may not 
for the first time on appeal claim that Mr. 
Marshall lacks standing to assert a privacy 
interest in the contraband seized to uphold the 
trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.2 
PRETEXT STOP 
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper 
Avery used the fact that his turn signal was 
malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his vehicle 
to search for evidence of drug trafficking. 
The protective shield of the fourth amend-
ment applies when an officer stops an auto-
mobile on the highway and detains its occup-
ants. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). A police officer may constit-
utionally stop a citizen on two alternative 
grounds. First, the stop "could be based on 
specific, articulable facts which, together with 
rational inferences drawn from those facts, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
[defendant] had committed or was about to 
commit a crime." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Christensen, 
676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Tru-
jillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
Second, the police officer can "stop an auto-
mobile for a traffic violation committed in the 
officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. 
However, an officer may not use a traffic 
violation stop as a pretext to search for evid-
ence of a more serious crime. Id. 
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. 
Marshall's vehicle to investigate his hunch 
that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved in 
drug trafficking, we determine whether a 
hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the 
totality of the circumstances confronting him 
or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to 
issue a warning for failing to terminate a turn 
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signal. Id. at 978. 
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop 
of his vehicle is similar to the stop we found 
unconstitutional in Sierra. We disagree. In 
Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was 
that the driver remained in the left lane too 
long after passing a car. In this case, Trooper 
Avery perceived an equipment problem with 
Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was 
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to 
turn it off.3 Courts consistently have held that 
a police officer can stop a car when he or she 
believes the car's safety equipment is not 
functioning properly.4 
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra, 
Trooper Avery was not suspicious of Mr. 
Marshall for other reasons before the stop, 
had not followed him in order to find some 
reason to pull him over, and, before the 
alleged violation occurred, had not radioed for 
help thereby indicating he intended to stop the 
vehicle. 
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's 
stop of Mr. Marshall's vehicle was not a 
pretext, but was a valid exercise of police 
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle was functioning properly. 
UNREASONABLE DETENTION 
Next, Mr. Marshall complains generally that 
the extent of his detention and the scope of 
Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded con-
stitutional limits.5 Again, we disagree. 
Once a driver is lawfully stopped, an officer 
may inquire as to information about the driver 
and the vehicle "reasonably related in scope to 
the justification" for the detention. United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 
(1975) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 
(1968)). 
The United States Supreme Court has not 
chosen to define a bright-line rule as to the 
acceptable length of a detention because 
"common sense and ordinary human experi-
ence must govern over rigid criteria." United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). 
The Court has chosen to focus, not on the 
length of the detention alone, but on "whether 
the police diligently pursued a means of inve-
stigation that was likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly, during which time it 
was necessary to detain the defendant." Id. at 
686. 
In Sharpe, the Court found that a twenty-
minute detention after a highway stop for 
suspected drug trafficking was not excessive 
where the officer examined the driver's 
license, examined his ownership papers, req-
uested and was denied permission to search 
the camper, and then stepped on the rear 
bumper, noting that it did not move, thus 
confirming his suspicion that it was overlo-
aded. Id. at 687. The Court distinguished this 
reasonable detention from those involved in 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979);' 
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Honda v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); and 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), 
stating that it was not the length of detention, 
but the events which occurred during the det-
ention which transformed the investigative 
stops in these cases into a "defacto arrest.'' Id. 
at 683-86.* 
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning cita-
tion within ten minutes of stopping Mr. 
Marshall. Based upon the facts obtained 
during routine questioning and issuing the 
warning citation, the officer became suspicious 
that Mr. Marshall was involved in transporting 
drugs. He returned Mr. Marshall's driver's 
license, the car rental agreement and the cita-
tion. Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall 
if he was carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs 
in the vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was 
not. Then Trooper Avery immediately asked 
for permission to look into the vehicle and 
received Mr. Marshall's consent. 
We find that Trooper Avery's initial inve-
stigation was within the scope of his traffic 
stop and that Trooper Avery's immediate 
request to search the vehicle and his expedit-
ious completion of the search did not consti-
tute an unreasonable detention. Furthermore, 
Mr. Marshall was not moved to another loc-
ation nor treated in a manner to support a 
finding of a "defacto arrest." 
CONSENT 
Finally, Mr. Marshall argues that even if his 
initial stop and subsequent detention were not 
constitutionally deficient, the subsequent 
search of the suitcases found in the trunk of 
the vehicle without a warrant violated his 
fourth amendment rights. The state contends, 
on the other hand, that Mr. Marshall conse-
nted to the search of the suitcases and thus 
Trooper Avery's search of the suitcases and 
subsequent seizure of the marijuana without a 
search warrant was constitutionally permiss-
ible. ? 
A search is valid under the fourth amend-
ment if it is conducted as a result of the def-
endant's voluntary consent. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). "[TJhe question [of] whether a consent 
to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the 
product of duress or coercion, express or 
implied, is a question of fact to be determined 
from the totality of all the circumstances." 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. "A trial court's 
finding of voluntary consent will not be reve-
rsed unless it is clearly erroneous." United 
States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 113a (1st Cir. 
1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979). 
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 
(10th Cir. 1977), the Tenth Circuit outlined 
the specifics necessary for the government to 
sustain its burden to show that voluntary 
consent was given: 
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(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and 
"freely and intelligently given"; (2) 
the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coer-
cion, express or implied; and (3) the 
courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights 
and there must be convincing evid-
ence that such rights were waived. 
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 
310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)). See also 
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453 
(10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whit-
tenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State 
v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents 
to a search, the ensuing search must be limited 
in scope to only the specific area agreed to by 
defendant. "The scope of a consent search is 
limited by the breadth of the actual consent 
itself .... Any police activity that transcends 
the actual scope of the consent given encroa-
ches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
suspect." United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 
377 (10th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., People v. 
Thwet, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope 
of consent exceeded when police asked to 
"look around" the house, then conducted a 45-
minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and 
closed containers). 
The trial court made the following finding 
on the issue of Mr. Marshall's consent: "The 
Defendant consented to the search. There was 
no evidence of duress or coercion." This 
conclusory finding on consent is not particul-
arly helpful in determining whether Mr. 
Marshall's consent was "unequivocal and 
specific" as it does not detail what Mr. Mar-
shall agreed could be searched-the interior 
of the passenger compartment, the trunk, or 
the locked suitcases. The relevant portions 
from the transcript of Trooper Avery's testi-
mony are more enlightening: 
Q. What were the words he [sicJ 
used when you asked him to search 
his vehicle? 
A. I asked Mr. Marshall if—if 
there were any-if there was any-
-were there any drugs in the 
vehicle, and he took two or three 
seconds—no, wait a minute, I 
guess-I first asked him if he was 
carrying any weapons and he told 
me no. I then asked him if he was 
carrying any-if there was any 
alcohol in the vehicle, he said that 
he did not drink. I recall both 
answers were quite quick. And then 
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I asked him if there were any drugs 
in the vehicle, he paused for, you 
know, probably two or three 
seconds, and then told me no. I 
then asked him if it would be okay 
if I looked in the vehicle, search the 
vehicle, and he said go ahead. 
Q. Now, did you ask if you could 
look in the vehicle, or did you ask 
if you could search the vehicle. 
A. Well, according to this [his 
report], I said-I asked if I could 
look in the vehicle. 
Q. So, it was "look in the 
vehicle"? 
You didn't ask if you could open 
anything inside the vehicle or any-
thing else, did you? 
A. No. I just asked if I could 
look in the vehicle. 
Q. And what happened then? 
A. Mr. Marshall just told me, 
you know, he said go right ahead. 
He got out, gathered up his papers 
and we walked up to the front of 
the vehicle, and he had to open the 
passenger door, as I recall. 
Q. And how did you get in the 
trunk? 
A. I asked him, I said-asked 
him if he had the key to the trunk 
and he says yes, and I says-and 
I asked him if he's [sic] open it, 
which he did, he tried. He was 
extremely nervous at the time. I -
Q. So did you open the trunk? 
A. No, sir, I did not. He-he 
could not-there was a little latch 
over the key hole. He was shaking 
so hard, he couldn't even hold the 
latch open, so I held the latch up 
for him so he could insert the key. 
Q. And what was inside the 
trunk? 
A. There were four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look 
in those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of 
all, I asked him what was in the 
suitcases, and he told me, right 
quickly, clothes. Then when I 
looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they 
came from, they must have been in 
there when he rented the car. 
Q. At that point, you opened the 
suitcases? 
A. Couldn't open them, they 
were padlocked shut. 
Q. So, you broke the lock? 
A. No. I~one part could zip 
open a little ways, and I opened it-
-or unzipped it, far enough where 
I could see the contents of one bag. 
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Q. And you didn't ask permis-
sion to look inside the suitcases, did 
you? 
A. I don't recall if I asked spec-
ifically to look inside those, no. 
Q. So, to look inside the suitc-
ases, you were based on the perm-
ission to look inside the vehicle; is 
that correct? 
A. Well, I retract that. His first 
response was clothes when I asked 
him what it was, and then I asked 
him if I could look in the suitcases, 
and he told me, well, they're not 
mine, they must have been in the 
trunk when I rented the car. So, 
yes, he did say they weren't his. 
Q. If they weren't his, how come 
you charged him with the crime? 
A. He told me they weren't his, 
that's what he said. He said g o -
when I asked-
Q. But you didn't ever get per-
mission from him to search the 
suitcases, did you? And at that 
point, you had them out of the 
vehicle; is that correct? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). I took 
one out. 
Q. And it was locked? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q. And you had to work around 
the lock to look inside? 
A. Well, there was a little play in 
it, enough where you could see 
inside. 
Q. And to look inside the suit-
case, you were basing the permis-
sion to look inside the vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall contends that Trooper 
Avery's request to "look in the car" did not 
constitute a request to search the vehicle. We 
disagree. Mr. Marshall gave his consent, alt-
hough not precisely phrased as consent "to 
search," then stood by while the trooper sea-
rched the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle. "Failure to object to the continuation 
of the search under these circumstances may 
be considered an indication that the search 
was within the scope of consent." United 
States v. Espinoza, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th 
Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Corral-
Corral, 702 F. Supp. 1539, 1544 (D. Wyo. 
1988). 
Because of our holding, we need not reach 
the more difficult issue of whether Mr. Mar-
shall's opening the trunk constituted implied 
consent to search the trunk under the totality 
of the circumstances presented. See United 
States v. Ahnand, 565 F.2d 927, 930 (5th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) 
(voluntary consent found where defendant 
silently reached into his pocket, removed key, 
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then unlocked and opened camper door). 
Mr. Marshall did not consent to Trooper 
Avery's search of the locked suitcases. The 
state does not argue that Mr. Marshall's 
consent to search the trunk should be const-
rued to include locked suitcases found in the 
trunk.8 Rather, the state argues that his disc-
laimer of ownership of the suitcases should be 
construed to validate the search. We agree that 
Mr. Marshall made a somewhat ambiguous 
disclaimer of ownership of the four suitcases 
found in the trunk of the vehicle, but he did 
not give his consent to their search.9 The state 
has not referred us to any case where a discl-
aimer of ownership has been held to be a 
voluntary consent to search. The cases appr-
oving the subsequent search of a suitcase after 
disclaimer of ownership have all turned on the 
threshold issue of standing or abandonment, 
not consent.10 We refuse to rely on this auth-
ority as it would allow the state to circumvent 
the teachings of State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 
1132 (Utah 1989), and allow the state to raise 
the issue of fourth amendment standing for 
the first time on appeal by way of the back 
door. 
In summary, we reverse the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress as Mr. Mar-
shall did not consent-in-fact11 to the search 
of the locked suitcases found in the trunk of 
his vehicle. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. The state relies upon the following testimony 
from the preliminary hearing: 
Q. And what was inside the trunk? 
A. There were four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look in 
those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I 
asked him what was in the suitcases, and 
he told me, right quickly, clothes. Then 
when I looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they came 
from, they must have been in there 
when he rented the car. 
2. Our conclusion may seem at odds with the 
general rule that we "may affirm the trial court's 
decision on any proper grounds, even though the 
trial court assigned another reason for its ruling." 
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). We 
agree with the general rule, but find the issue of 
fourth amendment standing to be unique. Fourth 
amendment standing involves more than simply 
applying another legal principle to sustain an evid-
entiary ruling. The failure to raise a fourth amend-
ment standing claim is more analogous to the failure 
to plead and try an affirmative defense or an 
attempt to assert a new theory of recovery for the 
first time on appeal. See Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 
P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) ("It is axiomatic that 
defenses and claims not raised by the parties in the 
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trial cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal."); State v. Johnson, 711 P.2cl 326, 327-28 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (defendant cannot raise con-
stitutional issues for-first time on appeal); Sampson 
v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(defendant cannot raise affirmative defense for first 
time on appeal); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 
801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("matters not raised in the 
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal."); Conder v. 
A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 637 
n,2 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (matters not presented to 
trial court prior to summary judgment cannot be 
raised for first time on appeal). The state asserts 
fourth amendment standing to validate what other-
wise would be an unconstitutional search. The def-
endant must have an opportunity to factually meet 
this defense to an unconstitutional search. 
Furthermore, although the Utah Supreme Court 
applied the waiver of fourth amendment standing 
rule to uphold the trial court's granting of a motion 
to suppress in Schlosser, the court relied On State v. 
Goodman, 42 Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 
(1985), which held the state could not raise the issue 
of standing for the first time on appeal to provide 
an alternative ground for sustaining the trial court's 
denial of a motion to suppress. I d at 1060. 
3. While the warning citation does not specify which 
provision of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, 
the state asserts that his conduct was in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-117(1) (1988) which, 
with our emphasis, provides: 
It is a misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for the owner to cause 
or knowingly permit to be driven or 
moved on any highway any vehicle or 
combination of vehicles which is in such 
unsafe condition as to endanger any 
person, or which does not contain those 
parts or is not at all times equipped with 
lamps and other equipment in proper 
condition and adjustment.... 
4. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 
(1979), the United States Supreme Court stated that 
an officer has a duty in the interest of highway 
safety to stop vehicles for safety reasons. "Many 
violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements 
are observable, and something can be done about 
them by the observing officer, directly and immed-
iately." Id. at 660. The Court inferred that as long 
as an officer suspects the driver is violating "any 
one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equi-
pment regulations," the police officer may legally 
stop the vehicle. Id. at 661. See Townsel v. State, 
763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court 
held stop justified when vehicle's headlight was out, 
a tail light was broken, the license plate and 
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. 
Puig, 112 Ariz. 519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) 
(suspicion of defective turn signals justified stop); 
State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 1989) (stop 
justified when blinking headlights led officer to stop 
vehicle for safety reasons). 
5. We do not analyze this issue under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as the state 
constitutional issue was not sufficiently particular-
ized below nor is a reasoned analysis provided on 
appeal as to why our analysis should be different 
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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6. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) 
(defendant taken from neighbor's home, transpo-
rted unwillingly to police station, was subjected to 
custodial interrogation for one hour until he made 
incriminating statements); Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491 (1983) (defendant stopped at airport, his 
luggage seized, then he was taken to a small room 
where he was questioned and his luggage inspected); 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) 
(defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized for 
90 minutes to take it to narcotics detection dog for 
"sniff test," police knew of arrival time and should 
have had the dog on hand). 
7. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had 
probable cause to search either the car or the suitc-
ases. We, therefore, need not deal with the troubl-
esome issue of whether probable cause to search an 
automobile is sufficient under the automobile exce-
ption to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk 
of a car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798 (1982) (if probable cause exists, police can 
search closed containers found in vehicle); Arkansas 
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (warrantless search 
of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi invalid); 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) 
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the 
trunk of a vehicle invalid); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264, 272 n.l (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J.f concur-
ring separately) (criticizing the Ross holding). 
8. See State v. Cole, 31 Wash. App. 501, 643 P.2d 
675 (1982), where the defendant gave permission to 
search his hatchback vehicle, but did not give 
consent to search the suitcases found in the vehicle. 
Id. at 678. The court held that the consent to search 
the vehicle did not encompass the suitcases. Id. 
9. Trooper Avery believed that Mr. Marshall's 
denial of ownership of the suitcases validated the 
search. He did what our case law has instructed and 
the defect in the search was not as a result of his 
actions, but rather those of the prosecutor in failing 
to properly raise the issue of standing. 
10. See United States v. Williams, 538 F.2d 549, 550-
51 (4th Cir. 1976) (court found abandonment and 
held cases properly seized when defendant denied 
ownership of certain cases found in his motel room 
and allowed the search of the cases); United States 
v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (court 
found abandonment when defendants disclaimed 
ownership of suitcases and began to walk away 
from them). 
11. We do not reach the issue of the voluntariness 
of Mr. Marshall's consent to the search of the car, 
the trunk, or the suitcases because we find there was 
no consent-in-fact to the search of the suitcases. See, 
e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973) (analysis of voluntariness of consent); State 
v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah a . App. 
1988) (state did not sustain its burden to prove 
defendant's consent was voluntary). 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff George "Nick" Kirk appeals an 
order granting the State's motion to dismiss 
his negligence action. We affirm. 
Plaintiffs complaint against the State stems 
from an injury he received while working as 
an unarmed bailiff at the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice. On April 2, 1985, Ronnie Lee 
Gardner, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, 
was escorted by two corrections officers to the 
Hall of Justice to attend court proceedings. In 
the basement of the building, a female acco-
mplice passed a loaded handgun to Gardner, 
who then exchanged gunfire with the officers. 
When plaintiff came down a stairwell to inv-
estigate the commotion, Gardner shot and 
seriously wounded him. See State v. Gardner, 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1989). 
The State moved to dismiss plaintiffs 
complaint under the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§63-30-1 to-38 (1989). The State con-
tended that it was immune from suit because 
plaintiffs injury resulted from the exercise of 
a governmental function. See Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-3 (1989). The State further argued 
that even if the injury resulted from the negl-
igent acts or omissions of state employees, 
there is no waiver of immunity if the injury 
"arises out of the incarceration of any person 
in any state prison ... or other place of legal 
confinement." See Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
10(1)0) (1989) (emphasis added). 
The district court granted the State's 
motion to dismiss, finding that the State's 
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The following amendments to the United States Constitution are 
determinative of this matter: 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Amendment XIV, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
The following provisions of the Constitution of the State of Utah are 
determinative of this appeal: 
Article 1, Section 1 
All men have the inherent and unalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship 
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceable, 
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right. 
Article 1, Section 14 
1 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
Article 1, Section 24 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Article 1, Section 27 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security 
of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government. 
The following statutes of the State of Utah are determinative of this appeal: 
Section 41-6-55 
Section 41-6-117 
Section 41-6-121.10 
Section 41-6-162 
Section 41-6-166 
Section 41-6-167 
Section 76-10-803 
Section 77-7-15 
Section 77-35-12 
The following regulation and rules of the Utah Department of Public 
Safety are determinative of this appeal: 
Utah Vehicle Safety Inspection Rule 735-100 
Rules and Regulations and Instructions for Official Vehicle Inspection 
Stations. 
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